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bstract
This paper assesses financial integration in Asia in terms of risk-sharing benefit versus financial contagion cost. We construct a new measure of
isk sharing based on a term structure model, which allows identification of realized stochastic discount factors. Risk sharing is low in Asia, and
aries across time and countries, whereas contagion risks are more significant intra-regionally, and relatively stable over the past decade. An overall
radeoff exists between risk sharing and contagion, but the terms of tradeoffs vary across countries, depending on relative economic fluctuations
nd inflation differentials. Asia therefore can potentially enhance risk sharing without raising contagion risk.
2012 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.. Introduction
Financial integration holds a great promise in theory. It is
xpected to be a catalyst for (i) transferring resources from less
roductive to more productive regions, (ii) allowing countries to
iversify and insure against idiosyncratic shocks via risk shar-
ng, and (iii) fostering financial market development, and hence
rowth and macroeconomic stability, among others. Evidence of
ow much these benefits have materialized in practice is at best
ixed in the last two cases (Kose et al., 2009; Nicolo and Juvenal,
010), but near absent in the first (Lucas, 1990). Meanwhile, the
pposing view that financial integration brings with it costly
nancial crises, amplified by contagion and spillover effects,
as recently gained ground, propelled not least by the global
nancial crisis. There is a growing discomfort that financial inte-
ration is not only a double-edged sword, but may be integral
o how financial crises arise and are exacerbated internationally
Stiglitz, 2004, 2010b; Devereux and Yetman, 2010b).E-mail address: phurichai@gmail.com
879-9337 © 2012 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of
fricagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.The lack of clarity about the extent of benefits from financial
ntegration and the potential cost involved pose a dilemma to
olicy makers, especially in emerging market countries. Asian
conomies have stepped up efforts to foster more intra-regional
nancial integration after the 1997 financial crisis, in a bid to
educe reliance on bank and foreign funding with a conviction
hat the integration will fortify the regional financial system and
ring net economic benefits to the region. Should the policy
akers continue to promote more regional financial integra-
ion to accelerate the benefit, or should these efforts now be put
n reverse to curb the risks of financial contagion and preempt
ystemic disruption emanating from closer and more complex
nancial linkages?
This paper contributes to the debate by assessing financial
ntegration in Asia jointly from both benefit and cost perspec-
ives. We focus on the risk management function of financial
ntegration where the tension is most distinct: the benefit is
njoyed if financial integration allows risks to be shared across
orders, while the cost is incurred when risks spill over from
ne country to another. We quantify the extent of risk sharing
nd contagion risks using a novel asset price approach which
ffers a number of advantages. Our estimates show that intra-
egional risk sharing in Asia is low both in absolute term (i.e.
ar lower than the full risk-sharing benchmark), and relative to
he degree of risk sharing vis-a`-vis the US or EU. By contrast,
ntra-regional contagion spillovers are found to be more evident.
joint examination of risk sharing and contagion risks reveals
discernible tradeoff to financial integration, but the terms of
radeoff are found to vary widely across countries. These dif-
erences, we show, depend on certain contextual factors, which
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a cross-border no-arbitrage condition which implies that
log Mit+1 = log Mjt+1 + log
et+1
et
(2.3)02 P. Rungcharoenkitkul / Review of D
elp explain why financial integration is more successful for
ome countries than others.
Our results suggest that Asia is yet to make the most out of
he existing degree of financial integration, and there is a room
or more risk-sharing benefit to be obtained without necessarily
aising the cost of contagion risks. One clear option for policy
akers is to continue promoting financial market developments,
o enhance the risk-sharing function of the financial markets.
ur findings point towards other possibilities that should not be
verlooked. For instance, better and more coordinated cyclical
acroeconomic management can help both directly by keeping
isks low, and indirectly by enhancing the risk-sharing capabil-
ty. In general, since benefits of financial integration can vary
ver the cycles, the role of policy should extend beyond an
stablishment of appropriate infrastructure or other structural
ettings.
Methodologically, our approach contains several novel fea-
ures that set this paper apart from the literature. The measure
f risk sharing is grounded on the asset-pricing theory predic-
ion that stochastic discount factors should be equalized under
erfect risk sharing. Unlike previous studies, we attempt to esti-
ate ex post realization of stochastic discount factors directly,
rawing on information contained in government bond yield
urves together with an identifying restriction imposed by a no-
rbitrage affine term structure model. Financial contagion, on the
ther hand, is estimated as the extent of tail event spillovers from
ne stock market to another, through the estimation of quantile
egressions of stock returns (based on the ‘CoVaR’ approach due
o Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2010). Our attempt to characterize
he terms of cost–benefit tradeoffs to financial integration is, to
ur knowledge, the first empirical exercise of its kind.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
ur asset-pricing analytical framework and describes the broad
mpirical objectives. Section 3 lays out the details of how a
erm structure model and bond yields can be used to construct
measure of risk sharing. The estimates of contagion risks and
he implied cost–benefit tradeoffs to financial integration is the
opic of Section 4. An exploration of how the heterogeneity of
he tradeoffs can be explained by contextual factors is pursued
n Section 5, before Section 6 concludes.
. The asset price framework
Asset prices are a rich source of information and have often
een relied on to provide unique insights to the study of financial
ntegration. For example, in measuring the extent of financial
ntegration, the ‘price-based’ approach, which makes use of the
aw of one price, such as covered interest parity conditions, is as
opular as the ‘quantity-based’ approach, which draws on sizes
f cross-border flows and asset holdings. See Cavoli et al. (2004)
or a survey.
This paper bypasses the issue of the extent of financial inte-
ration, and instead focuses directly on the implications of
reater financial integration in terms of risk sharing and financial
ontagion. Given these objectives, we argue that the asset price
pproach can be even more insightful. This is self-evident in the
ase of financial contagion which is fundamentally an asset-price
s
bpment Finance 2 (2012) 101–117
oncept, e.g. even a large coordinated portfolio investment out-
ow can hardly be termed a financial contagion in the absence of
n extreme and correlated fall in asset prices. On the other hand,
he degree of international risk sharing is traditionally mea-
ured by the cross-country correlation of consumption growth, a
uantity-based approach (the seminal paper being Lewis, 1996).
ur asset-price approach is rooted on the same theoretical foun-
ation as Lewis (1996), but by looking at asset prices directly,
e do not have to make any specific assumption about the utility
unction, which is needed in Lewis (1996) to justify consump-
ion growth as the proxy for the marginal rate of substitution.
n addition, our approach relies on higher frequency financial
arket data and is grounded on a structural asset pricing model,
ence can yield more insights on both the degree and nature of
isk sharing (for instance, that risk sharing can vary significantly
ver time, driven by interactions between the amount of risks
nd prices of risks).
To evaluate the implications of financial integration via the
sset-price approach, one clearly needs to go beyond the law
f one price. Simple correlation between asset returns is not an
ppropriate measure of either risk sharing or financial contagion.
n this paper, we propose a more refined empirical method, as
he next two sections explain.
.1. Risk sharing
There is perfect risk sharing between countries i and j if and
nly if the stochastic discount factors for the two countries are
qualized1:
i
t+1 = Mjt+1 (2.1)
o the extent that there is less than perfect risk sharing, the
istance between the two stochastic discount factors indicates
he degree of constrained risk sharing. It is natural then that
statistical measure of risk sharing should be based on this
istance. Brandt et al. (2006) defines a metric:
CSi,j = 1 −
var(log Mit+1 − log Mjt+1)
var(log Mit+1) + var(log Mjt+1)
(2.2)
hich ranges from −1 to 1, with a higher number indicat-
ng better risk sharing. We shall refer to this metric as the
randt–Cochrane–Santa-Clara (BCS) index.
The stochastic discount factors Mit+1 and M
j
t+1 are of course
nobserved, prompting many researchers to resort to an indirect
nference approach. For example, Brandt et al. (2006) assumes1 The stochastic discount factors intuitively measure the marginal rates of
ubstitution in the two countries, which, if equalized, imply perfect risk sharing
ecause all country-specific shocks are shared equally. See Cochrane (2001).
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here et is the spot price of j’s currency per one unit of i’s
urrency.2 They then substitute the numerator of the BCS index
y var(log(et+1/et)). Since the stochastic discount factors are
nown to be much more volatile than the exchange rates, theBCS
ndex should be close to 1 and they conclude that the degree of
isk sharing must be high (or the exchange rates are too smooth).
An alternative and more direct way to test the hypothesis of
erfect risk sharing is to estimate the stochastic discount factor
irectly. Various attempts in the literature have focused on some
oments of the discount factors, however. For instance, Flood
nd Rose (2005) and Hanhardt and Ansotegui (2009) start by
xpanding the fundamental asset pricing equation:
Pit = Et(Mit+1Xit+1)
= Et(Mit+1)Et(Xit+1) + Covt(Mit+1Xit+1)
(2.4)
here Pit is the asset’s price and Xit+1 the payoff of the asset.
heir strategy then consists of writing down a factor model for
ovt(Mit+1Xit+1) and using stock prices to back out Et(Mit+1).
In this paper, we will use the fundamental asset pricing equa-
ion as the core of our building block to examine the stochastic
iscount factors directly. Our point of departure is to estimate
he actual realization of Mit+t for each market i, not just its first
oment. The distinction, our results will show, is important
ecause a large part of fluctuations in Mit+t is driven by the
nteractions between prices of risks and realized shocks. Look-
ng at the prices of risks alone, via the expectation of Et(Mit+1),
oes not give a complete picture of how successful risk sharing
echanism works in periods of high volatility. As a matter of
ure principles, it is also unclear why Et(Mit+1) should provide
good basis for evaluating risk sharing.3
There is no known method for extracting the realized stochas-
ic discount factors from the stock market data, as there is simply
ot enough information contained in a univariate variable such
s a stock index. We propose a new approach, drawing on gov-
rnment bond term structure which is a much richer source of
nformation. We retain the assumption that there is no-arbitrage
ithin any given country i, so that there exists a positive ran-
om variable Mit+1 pricing all domestic assets, and attempt to
stimate it directly using suitable identifying restrictions. These
estrictions derive from the no-arbitrage conditions set in the
ontext of an affine term structure model. The market is assumed
o be complete within each country, so that the estimated stochas-
ic discount factor is indeed the unique one.4 We do not assume
ross-border no-arbitrage, therefore Eq. (2.3) needs not hold.
2 Eq. (2.3) is based on the premise that asset j, when denominated in i’s cur-
ency, must also be priced by Mi
t+1 and vice versa. Thus the condition can be
nterpreted as a parity condition. See detailed derivation in Backus et al. (2001).
3 Assuming a homethetic utility function form in an optimal consumption
roblem, Mt+1 is reduced to consumption growth. Cochrane (2001, p. 57) says
f risk sharing condition: “This prediction is so radical, it is easy to misread it
t first glance. It does not say that expected consumption growth is equal: it says
hat ex post consumption growth is equal.”
4 With incomplete markets, there is no unique stochastic discount factor, and
he estimate of Mi
t+1 represents the pricing kernel projected on the space of
ond returns. In this case, the discount factor and the measure of risk sharing
re specific to the bond market. It is notable, however, that the estimate of Mt+1
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nstead, the estimated time-series of Mit+1 can be used to con-
truct the BCS index directly.
.2. Contagion
Critics of financial globalization often point out the systemic
ature of risks in an intricate global financial network, where
isruptions in one region can spread throughout the system in
financial contagion. Such a suboptimal outcome can arise
n the presence of market imperfections, such as incomplete
redit markets in Allen and Gale (2001), or non-convex pro-
uction technology in Stiglitz (2010a). More generally, there is
growing recognition of the importance of financial accelera-
or mechanism, enabled by interconnected financial market and
ntermediaries and financial frictions, in exacerbating the impact
f shocks on the real economy (see Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010
nd references therein). A growing appreciation of these down-
ide risks has led some to question the wisdom of promoting
ore financial integration, e.g. through further liberalization of
apital accounts (see Stiglitz, 2010b).
In this paper, we acknowledge the possibility of financial
ontagion without subscribing to any particular theory of why
r how it arises, and focus on how to empirically account for it as
he cost to financial integration. There are some basic criteria for
good measure of contagion cost in our application. First, the
ost should not be accounted for only when an actual contagion
r crisis occurs, but instead should reflect the degree of risk
xposure, i.e. the shadow price paid by integrating more closely
ith other markets. Secondly, a measure of contagion should
o beyond the notion of simple correlation, and focus on the
ross-market spillover at the negative tail of the distribution, i.e.
hen a stress in one market brings about a stress in another
arket. Finally, in order to evaluate the contagion cost along
ide the benefit of risk sharing, it must be possible to express in
ggregate how exposed one market is to contagion, compared to
nother.
In light of these considerations, this paper applies a simple
tatistical measure of ‘CoVaR’ (Conditional Value-at-Risk) due
o Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) to equity markets.5 Intu-
tively, the CoVaR concept measures the extent to which a tail
vent in one market can spill over and create or worsen a tail
vent in another market. This measure is computed by per-
orming quantile regressions of one asset returns conditional
n another, thus the attention is squarely on tail correlation. The
stimated coefficient or ‘beta’ then describes the degree of expo-
ure to the financial contagion risk. Aggregating the magnitude
f spillovers stemming from different countries gives a mea-
ure of one country’s exposure as desired. We draw on returns
f stocks rather than bonds when computing CoVaR, because
btained below for the case of US has moments that are similar to prior estimates
ased on the stock market.
5 A number of alternative measures are available: Diebold and Yilmaz (2009)
onstruct a measure of spillover based on variance decomposition of VARs in
eturn and volatilities, while Engle et al. (2009) proposed a class of Multiplica-
ive Error Model (MEM), a GARCH-based measure of volatility spillovers. As
ection 4.1 will show, our results are broadly consistent with these studies.
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f the close association between the stock market and financial
rises as well as times of stress in general.
. Measuring risk sharing from bond prices
Our key identification strategy is to exploit the information
ontained in the term structure of government bond markets, and
xtract the underlying stochastic discount factors Mt+1 directly
sing an affine term structure model. Bonds are a unique asset
lass for this purpose, given their term structure characteris-
ic (unlike, e.g. stocks). This means that the information about
xpectation of the future is inherent in a yield curve, allowing
xplicit modeling of deviations from expectations and associated
rices of risks, both of which are central components of Mt+1.
he important identifying assumption is that there is no arbi-
rage opportunity within any bond market, so that there exists a
ingle Mt+1 that prices all bonds in any given market.
.1. Afﬁne term structure model
This section briefly reviews the key ingredients of the affine
erm structure model.6 Assume that there is a state vector Xt
hich evolves as a VAR process of order 1:
t = μ + KXt−1 + Σεt (3.1)
here εt ∼N(0, I). The choice of Xt throughout this paper will be
he first three principal components of the term structure, which
re known to be flexible enough in describing any shape of yield
urve. The risk-free one-period interest rate is assumed to be an
ffine function of the state variable:
t = δ0 + δ′1Xt (3.2)
nder no-arbitrage assumption, the fundamental asset pricing
pplied to bonds is given by
n,t = Et(Mt+1Pn−1,t+1) (3.3)
here Pn,t is the price of n-period zero-coupon bond at time t,
nd Mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor. We adopt a typical
ssumption that Mt+1 is lognormal, taking the form
t+1 = exp
[
−rt − 12λ
′
tλt − λ′tεt+1
]
(3.4)
here the λt, the price of risk, is also affine in the state variable:
t = Λ0 + Λ1Xt (3.5)
The system of Eqs. (3.1)–(3.5) describes the elements of an
ffine term structure model. Solving the pricing kernel equa-
ion (3.3) recursively backwards, using as a terminal condition
0,t+1 = 1, and substitute for rt and λt, the solution for the log
ond price, pn,t ≡ log Pn,t, can be shown to be affine in the state
s welln,t = An + B′nXt (3.6)
6 See Dai and Singleton (2000), Duffee (2002) and Ang and Piazzesi (2003)
mong others for details on how an affine model is specified and solved.
m
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here An and Bn are solutions to the following system of differ-
nce equations
An = An−1 − δ0 + B′n−1(μ − ΣΛ0) +
1
2
B′n−1ΣΣ
′Bn−1
B′n = B′n−1(K − ΣΛ1) − δ′1
(3.7)
ith initial conditions A1 = − δ0 and B′1 = −δ′1. Given these
olutions, the log gross yield yn,t ≡ log(1 + Yn,t) = − pn,t/n is
learly also affine in the state
n,t = −An
n
− B
′
n
n
Xt (3.8)
.2. Estimation
The data set consists of monthly time-series of zero-
oupon government bond yields obtained from Bloomberg (see
ppendix A for details) which covers 13 countries includ-
ng Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia,
alaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, China, India, US and
U (approximated by the German Bund). The series start
rom January 2000 to May 2011 for all countries except
ndonesia (starting from February 2003) and China (starting
rom September 2003). The available maturities are 3-month,
-year, 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 15-year.
The empirical objective is to obtain an estimate of Mt+1 which
s most consistent with the time-series of observed zero-coupon
ields while respecting the restrictions imposed by no-arbitrage
ffine model. Since the functional form of Mt+1 is assumed, the
roblem is simply that of parametric estimation. One approach
s to assume that yields are observed with gaussian errors and
stimate the parameters θ = {μ, K, Σ, δ0, δ1, Λ0, Λ1} using
he maximum likelihood method which effectively minimizes
he sum of squared error between observed yields and the fitted
alues,
∑N
n=1
∑T
t=1(yn,t − yˆn,t)2.
However, the maximum likelihood method is notoriously
xpensive to implement, given that the likelihood surface is
ighly nonlinear in the parameters with no closed-form solu-
ion. Unless one starts the numerical optimization with a good
et of initial conditions for the parameters, the estimates may
nly give local optima. Searching for the global optimal can
herefore be very costly, particularly in our case since the same
rocedure must be repeated for each of the 13 countries.
To circumvent this problem, we first execute an alternative
stimation procedure, recently proposed by Adrian and Moench
2010), which is asymptotically consistent and implementable
y multi-step cross-sectional linear regressions along the line of
ama and Macbeth (1973). Their basic insight is to express the
odel in the space of excess returns instead of yields, which
akes the model tenable to linear estimation. See Appendix B
or a brief overview of the steps and rationale for this procedure.
Our estimation strategy is to first use the Adrian–Moench
ethod to obtain a set of first-round estimates, before refining the
stimates with maximum likelihood at a significantly reduced
ost given a good set of initial conditions. Specifically, for each
ountry we perform the following set of computations:
P. Rungcharoenkitkul / Review of Development Finance 2 (2012) 101–117 105
Table 1
Affine term structure model fit.
RMSE (%) Adrian–Moench After refinements Unrestricted
Japan 0.0786 0.0252 0.0127
Hong Kong 0.0707 0.0430 0.0346
Korea 0.1842 0.0519 0.0396
Singapore 0.0722 0.0441 0.0323
Taiwan 0.0346 0.0282 0.0256
Indonesia 0.4130 0.1936 0.1283
Malaysia 0.1145 0.0571 0.0480
The Philippines 0.4327 0.1612 0.1495
Thailand 0.0696 0.0488 0.0429
China 0.0776 0.0595 0.0497
India 0.1005 0.0665 0.0517
US 0.0631 0.0498 0.0400
E
1
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4
5
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w
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Table 2
Summary statistics of mt+1.
Mean S.D.
Japan −0.26 1.01
Hong Kong −0.11 0.51
Korea −0.33 0.89
Singapore −0.18 0.63
Taiwan −0.19 0.67
Indonesia −0.30 1.64
Malaysia −0.23 0.64
The Philippines −0.26 0.97
Thailand −0.13 0.52
China −0.21 0.83
India −0.13 0.68
US −0.17 0.55
E
d
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H
1
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(
T
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i
NU 0.0388 0.0270 0.0180
Interpolate the yield curve in each time period, using piece-
wise cubic Hermite polynomial.7 Use the interpolated yields
to compute the first three principal components, log prices,
and excess returns over 1-month holding period. The 1-month
yield serves as the short-term interest rate rt.
Estimate a VAR in the three principal components, to get
estimates for μ, K, Σ and the associated residual εt. Regress
the short-term interest rate rt on the state variables to obtain
δ0 and δ1. These estimates are treated as fixed.
Implement the Adrian–Moench procedure to obtain ˆΛ0 and
ˆΛ1 (see Appendix B).
Refine the estimates via a maximum likelihood routine, by
choosing Λ0 and Λ1 to minimize the sum of squared yield fit
errors,
∑10
n=1
∑T
t=1(yn,t − yˆn,t)2, setting the initial conditions
for Λ0 and Λ1 equal to ˆΛ0 and ˆΛ1 obtained from the previous
step.
Recover the log stochastic discount factor log Mt+1 ≡
mt+1 = −rt − λ′tλt − λ′tεt+1.
This procedure is indeed fast to implement. Step 4 in particu-
ar is now much faster than a typical maximum likelihood routine
ith random initial conditions. Furthermore, the refined optimal
alues are in all cases within a close proximity of ˆΛ0 and ˆΛ1,
uggesting that the Adrian–Moench procedure is effective in pin-
ing down the likely range of the true parameters. Refinements
n the other hand helps improve the goodness of fit noticeably
n most cases, as shown by the root mean squared errors pre-
ented in Table 1. The errors of refined estimates are moreover
nly a few basis points higher than the lower bound implied by
he unrestricted linear model, shown in the last column, which
egresses yields directly on the three principal components. Thus
ur multiple-round estimation procedure is effective in both (i)
eeping the estimation cost low, and (ii) obtaining a good fit for
he model and, by implications, a reliable estimate of mt+1.Table 2 presents summary statistics for our estimates of log
tochastic discount factors. The discount factors are volatile,
ut at a scale that is similar to prior findings on stock market
7 We choose this method over cubic spline to avoid excessive oscillation that
therwise would arise intermittently in the sample.
c
T
o
B
sU −0.09 0.34
ata. The volatility in the US case of 0.55 is almost the same as
.50 which is a typical stock market benchmark obtained from
ansen-Jagannathan bound using 8% mean excess return and
6% standard deviation (Hansen and Jagannathan, 1991). For
ll countries, almost all of the movements in discount factors
re explained by time-varying risks and their prices rather than
ovements in the short-term interest rates. The volatilities of
iscount factors also dominate those of exchange rates, which
re no higher than 0.13 per year in our sample, consistent with
he observation of Brandt et al. (2006). Therefore our method
f extracting the discount factors from the bond market yields
esults that are broadly consistent with prior estimates in terms
f moments.
.3. Risk sharing measures
When it comes to measuring the degree of risk sharing
etween country pairs however, the moments alone are less
nformative, precisely because the discount factors fluctuate so
uch over time. It is necessary to track how similar any pair
f discount factors are over time. Fig. 1 plots the time-series of
t+1 for selected countries. Fig. 1(a) plots the discount factor
or the US together with that of EU. The two series are similar
n levels and tend to co-move closely over time, particularly so
uring the so-called great moderation period of 2002–2007, and
gain after the global financial crisis. Such close relationship
etween the discount factors is much less visible for the Asian
ountries, whether among the newly industrialized economies
NIEs) consisting of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
Fig. 1(b)), or ASEAN3 including Malaysia, the Philippines and
hailand (Fig. 1(c)). The discount factors for these countries are
oth more volatile and less correlated with each other, lend-
ng little evidence of intra-regional risk sharing whether among
IEs or ASEAN.
To evaluate the degree of risk sharing more objectively, we
ompute the BCS index (Eq. (2.2)) for all pairs of 13 countries.
he results are shown in Table 3(a). Broadly speaking, the degree
f risk sharing between the 13 countries is moderate at best: the
CS indices average at 0.10, significantly below the full risk-
haring benchmark of 1. At the same time, behind this average
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(a) US and EU (b) NIEs
(c) ASEAN3
chast
n
s
a
w
(
H
c
p
H
s
r
r
c
I
w
m
t
N
B
A
a
e
n
b
(
m
b
w
p
q
cFig. 1. (a–c) Log sto
umber lies much heterogeneity, with certain pairs of countries
haring risks more successfully than others. Those with above
verage risk sharing are marked with light color, while those
ith BCS higher than one standard deviation from the mean
0.22) are in dark color.
Notable cases include the risk sharing between the US and
ong Kong, whose BCS index is the highest at 0.587. A very
lose financial integration together with a common monetary
olicy between the two economies mean that risks in the UK and
ong Kong are similarly priced, an evidence of significant risk
haring. Meanwhile the US and EU share a significant amount of
isks relative to others, reaffirming our earlier observation. The
esult may again not be surprising given the high degree of finan-
ial development and integration between the two economies.
n contrast, however, Japan does not share risks meaningfully
ith the US or EU despite having a well-developed financial
arket, suggesting that risk sharing is a function of much more
han financial integration.
w
P
eic discount factors.
Intra-regional risk sharing in Asia remains low, for both
IEs and ASEAN4 groups. In Table 3(a), the corresponding
CS indices are boxed and labelled A and B, respectively.
mong NIEs, only Hong Kong and Singapore are sharing risks
bove one standard deviation from average. Meanwhile, the
xtent of risk sharing between NIEs and ASEAN4 is more
oticeable, with Korea and Malaysia acting as core mem-
ers of their groups in sharing risks with the other faction
Table 3(a), box C). The US shares risks significantly with
ost NIEs, and to a lesser extent with ASEAN4 (Table 3(a),
oxes D and E). These results can be summarized in Table 3(b),
hich aggregate the BCS indices across the regions. Our
rice-based measures are consistent with findings based on
uantity-based measures that Asian countries are more finan-
ially integrated with major economies outside the region than
ith those within Asia (see Borensztein and Loungani, 2011;
ongsaparn and Unteroberdoerster, 2011; Cowen et al., 2006 for
xample).
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Table 3
Brandt Cochrane Santa-Clara (BCS) indices.
(a) By countries
(b) Summary by regions
Table 4
BCS over sub periods.
(a) Great Moderation (b) Global Financial Crisis
(c) Recovery
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oAs Fig. 1 suggests, the extent of risk sharing may potentially
ary over time, possibly driven by both cyclical and structural
hifts. To shed light on the nature of these changes over the past
ecade, the BCS indices are computed over three subperiods: (1)
he Great Moderation period of January 2002 to June 2007, (2)
he Global Financial Crisis from July 2007 to June 2009, and
3) the recovery period from July 2009 to May 2011.8 Table 4
how the evolution of risk sharing over the past decade.
8 These subsamples are used for the computation of the BCS indices, holding
xed the full-sample estimates of the stochastic discount factors. The subpe-
iod division is inevitably arbitrary. While the Great Moderation for advanced
conomies may have started as early as the 80s, we exclude the period before
002 because Asia remained weighed down by legacies from the Asian crisis.
lso we adopt mid-2007 as the starting point of the Global Financial Crisis, even
hough for many the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 may
e the watershed. Our view is that many signs and forms of market stresses have
merged long before Lehman’s demise, and the amount of risks to be shared
robably have already risen. As Fig. 1 shows, the pattern of risk sharing may
ave undergone a structure shift as early as the mid-2007.
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dRisk sharing among the US, EU and NIEs intensified dur-
ng the Great Moderation, weakened markedly during the crisis,
nd resumed strongly since the recovery. The benefits of finan-
ial integration for these economies have been reaped slowly
ver the period when shocks and risks were relatively modest.
isks associated with events as severe as the Global Financial
risis however were little shared between the major economies,
nd the economies at the center of the crisis, particularly the
S, were under-insured by other economies. As a result, the
tochastic discount factor of the US became highly volatile and
ittle correlated with other countries’ discount factors during the
risis.
Meanwhile, the intra-regional risk sharing within the
SEAN4 steadily climbed over the periods, while for NIEs the
pposite is the case. Behind this evolution, both cyclical and
tructural forces are likely at work. During the Global Financial
risis, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were jointly sharing
lot of risks, with BCS indices in the range of 0.26–0.35. The
iscount factors in all three economies became more volatile,
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ut remained close to and highly correlated with each other. In
ther words, as core members of emerging Asian economies,
he group underwent an episode of abrupt shift in prices of risks
uring the crisis, but was able to share risks efficiently. After
he recovery took hold, the discount factors stabilized for all
SEAN4, but the BCS indices between the Philippines versus
ndonesia, Malaysia and Thailand began to increase. The BCS
ndices for Thailand versus Malaysia and Indonesia also stay
igh, in contrast to the pre-crisis period. These recent devel-
pments provides tentative evidence that the recent increase in
ntra-regional risk sharing may at least partly be structural.
. Is there tradeoff to ﬁnancial integration?
Having characterized the progress of financial integration in
sia from the risk-sharing benefit perspective, we now turn to the
ip side of the coin. As mentioned in Section 2, one of the risks
o financial integration that has received much recent attention
s financial contagion. Assessing the extent and characteristics
f these contagion risks for Asia is the topic of the next sec-
ion. With estimates of both the benefits and costs of financial
ntegration, we will then discuss whether there exists a tradeoff
etween risk sharing and financial contagion in the case of Asia.
.1. Contagion risks
A measure of contagion risk should differ from the notion
f correlation in three aspects: (i) it is one-sided, in that it is
oncerned with only negative financial shocks, (ii) it is directed
ather than pairwise, in that it explicitly measures how shocks
pill over from a specific source country to a recipient, and (iii)
t measures systemic rather than generalized risks, by focusing
quarely on tail events. We use an empirical measure that sat-
sfies all three properties, by estimating how a realization of a
egative tail event in one market helps predict the severity of
he downside tail event in another market. In other words, we
odel the tail of the return distribution, conditional on another
arket’s return at the tail. Technically, the estimate follows the
CoVaR’ methodology introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier
2010), whose application is the construction of systemic risk
easure in the banking sector.
The data are weekly returns in the primary equity indices
f the same set of countries (see Appendix A for details). The
aseline estimation period conforms to that used to estimate
isk sharing, covering the week ending January 7, 2000 to June
0, 2011. Weekly rather than monthly data are used primarily
o harvest more information at the tails (the same frequency is
sed in Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2010).
The tail event is defined to be the threshold value on the
omain of return distribution, below which the realized return
ill fall with probability 5%. The tail event for market i is
herefore the value-at-risk (VaR) for the weekly return at 5%
onfidence level, which can be estimated by fitting a quantile
egression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) to the weekly return of
arket-i stock:
etit = a + b retit−1 + et (4.1)
C
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n the restricted model of b = 0, the fitted value aˆ is a sample
oint estimate of the 5% VaR. However we consider a general
odel and estimate b, as a simply way to model autoregressive
ime-varying tail risk:
aRit = aˆ + ˆb retit−1 (4.2)
To capture contagion, we estimate a similar quantile regres-
ion of market i, but this time conditional on concurrent
nformation received from market j:
etit = α + β retit−1 + γ retjt + t (4.3)
he fitted value of regression (4.3), when evaluated at retjt =
aR
j
t , defines the notion of conditional VaR, or ‘CoVaR’ in the
erminology of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010):
oVaR
i,j
t = αˆ + ˆβ retit−1 + γˆ VaRjt (4.4)
n other words, CoVaRi,jt measures the size of the potential tail
vent at market i conditional on the news that a 5% tail event
as already occurred in market j. A large and negative CoVaRi,jt
ndicates a significant financial contagion from market j to mar-
et i. Clearly CoVaR as so defined is one-sided, directed (since
oVaR
i,j
t /= CoVaRj,it in general) and aims to capture ‘tail’ risk
pillover.
It is useful for interpretation to express CoVaR in a relative
ather than absolute scale, namely how much additional tail risk
s generated for market i as conditions in market j deteriorate
rom the median return to the 5% value-at-risk. Thus, we define
ur contagion index from market j to market i as
ontag
i,j
t = γˆ(VaRjt − Medianj) (4.5)
here Medianj is the median weekly return, computed as the
tted value of regression (4.1) with b = 0 and confidence level
0%. Large and negative Contagi,jt means there is a significant
egree of downside contagion from market j to i, or equivalently
hat market i is exposed to systemic risk stemming from stress
n market j. We use this Contag measure as a gauge of costs
ccrued to market i, arising from being financially integrated to
arket j.
Averaging Contagi,jt across time t gives a mean exposure of
arket i to market j, denoted Contagi,j. The average contagion
atrix is presented in Table 5, where the sources of contagion
country j) are listed in rows, while the recipient countries i are on
olumns. For example, as the stock market return in Singapore
eteriorates from its median level to its stressed case of 5%
alue-at-risk level, our estimate implies that the repercussion on
ong Kong would be equivalent to a 4.147% downward adjust-
ent in the worst case scenario facing Hong Kong. The spillover
isks stemming from the financial centre countries, i.e. Hong
ong and Singapore, to others appear to be among the highest
ccording to the estimates. Averaging Contagi,j across i (to get
jontag ), highlights Singapore as the most systemic equity mar-
et with average Contagj of −3.181, followed by Hong Kong
ith Contagj of −2.986. On the other hand, the most ‘exposed’
arket is Korea, whose Contagi =
∑
∀jContagi,j/12 is 3.269.
P
.Rungcharo
enkitkul/Review
ofD
evelopm
entFinance
2(2012)101–117
109
Table 5
Contagion matrix: Contagi,j.
Note: Contagi,j measures the extent of contagion from market j onto market i.
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Table 5 also shows averages of Contagi and Contagj within
ub-groups NIEs, ASEAN4 and US-EU. Collectively as a
egion, NIEs is the most important source of risks for most
sian economies, especially other members in NIEs, and it
s also the region that is most exposed to contagion originat-
ng within Asia (note the shaded areas, which mark the region
ith the highest Contag). While the US and EU are mutually
xerting contagion risk onto each other, the degree of spillover
o Asia is more moderate. Thus, the contagion risk appears
n general to be transmitted mainly intra-regionally.9 This is
n contrast to the international risk-sharing pattern observed
arlier.
The result that NIEs, rather than the US and EU, are the
ain source of contagion risk for Asia is robust within vari-
us subsamples over the past decade – both γˆ and Contag are
table for different samples.10 The only notable breakpoint is
uring the Global Financial Crisis, when ASEAN4 became the
ain source of tail risk for the region itself, which reinforces
he extent of intra-regional spillover further. On the contrary,
hen we repeated the calculation over the previous decade
f 1987–1999, we found that the US and EU were the main
ources of tail risk for Asia during that episode. It seems to
e the case that progresses over the last decade in both finan-
ial and trade integration within Asia have already shifted the
ource of financial contagion for Asia from external to internal.
he overall results suggest that the degree to which conta-
ion risks rise with the extent of financial integration may be
haped by a number of other factors. Closer integration between
eal sectors via trade channel for example can increase the tail
vent correlation. The relative stability of the size and pattern
f these spillovers suggests that the determinant of financial
ontagion is largely structural and owes to an accumulative
rogress of globalization both in real and financial terms over a
ong period of time. Stalling or reversing the process of finan-
ial integration will probably do little to contain the contagion
isk in the medium-term. Rather, efforts should be invested
n enhancing the risk-sharing benefits obtained from financial
ntegration.
.2. Cost–beneﬁt tradeoff to integration
The BCS and Contag indices are explicit measures of the
enefits and costs of financial integration. The natural question
s whether there exists a cost–benefit tradeoff to financial inte-
ration in the sense that reaping more benefits from integration
ecessarily entails greater costs in terms of higher contagion
isks. In principles, a tradeoff is expected if both risk sharing and
ontagion risks increase with the degree of financial integration:
9 Gebka and Serwa (2007) also found some evidence from GARCH-type anal-
sis that intra-regional spillovers are more significant, although their sample only
ncludes emerging equity markets.
10 The result echoes the findings of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) that Hong Kong
nd Singapore are the major economies that exert return and volatility spillovers
o other Asian economies.
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wFig. 2. (a and b) Risk-return tradeoff to financial integration.
f BCS = f(integration) and Contag = g(integration) where f and
are both increasing functions, then
CS = f (g−1(Contag)) ≡ F (Contag) (4.6)
here F is a decreasing function, hence a tradeoff.11
To explore this issue, we do a scatter plot of BCS on the y-axis
gainstContag on the x-axis together with a fitted line. The result
s shown in Fig. 2(a). There is a discernible tradeoff as indicated
y the negatively sloped fitted line. The goodness of fit is not high
R2 = 0.03), but importantly the negative slope is significant: the
stimated slope is −0.02 with t-statistic of −2.21. Attaining
igher risk-sharing benefit, on average, requires a higher cost in
erms of contagion risk.
11 Recent examples of a full-fledged theoretical foundation for a tradeoff
etween risk sharing and financial contagion include Battiston et al. (2009)
hich highlights the ‘connectivity’ aspect of integration, and Devereux and
etman (2010a) which establishes the cost–benefit tension in a macro model
ith financial frictions in the form of leverage constraint.
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petitiveness all contribute to heterogeneous macroeconomic
conditions. There is again little scope for unilateral policy in this
case. A multilateral approach to promoting risk sharing, on theP. Rungcharoenkitkul / Review of D
An inspection of the terms of tradeoff for each individual
ase reveals a much more subtle pattern, however. In particular,
onsider Fig. 2(b) which overlays the original scatter plot with
ighlighted dots representing the US case together with an asso-
iated fitted line. This term of tradeoff lies close to the north-east
ound of the scatter, suggesting that the US more or less defines
he efficient cost–benefit frontier to integration for Asia. The
ajority of countries, in other words, are less successful than
he US in taking advantage of risk-sharing opportunities, given
he contagion costs incurred.
The next set of figures compare the scatter plots of other
ountries to the US tradeoff to highlight the differences. Fig. 3
hows that neither the EU nor Japan enjoys the same degree
f risk-return efficiency of the US. Hong Kong, whose risk
haring with the US is the highest, has a tradeoff frontier that
s close but still inferior to that of the US. Meanwhile, for
ther members of NIEs, the tradeoff lines are upward-sloping,
n indication that these countries have room to benefit from
ntegration without incurring higher costs and may have yet to
each their own efficient frontiers in integrating with the rest of
sia. Fig. 4 paints a broadly similar picture for ASEAN4, China
nd India, where there is also a significant potential gain from
ncreasing risk-sharing benefits without increasing the contagion
osts.
The apparent heterogeneity in the terms of tradeoffs points
owards differences in the ‘quality’ of financial integration in
sia. When this quality differs significantly, variations in the
egree of integration will not necessarily imply a positive and
niform correlation between contagion risks and risk sharing.
nstead, the cost–benefit tradeoff is contextualized by the addi-
ional quality factors, or Context:
CS = F (Contag, Context) (4.7)
n other words, while there may be an underlying positive rela-
ionship between BCS and Contag, with movements along the
elationship explained by variations in the degree of financial
ntegration, there is also a shift variable Context at work and
bscuring the reduced-form relationship. What is clear from
igs. 3 and 4 is that the latent factors Context play a role in
uppressing risk sharing for some countries. One policy option
o unlock the potential benefit of risk sharing is to relax these
ontext-related constraints.12
Our discussion will focus on four potentialContext factors: (i)
he extent of financial integration (namely, a greater quantity also
eads to a higher quality of integration), (ii) the degree of finan-
ial market developments, (iii) size of economic shocks, and (iv)
eneral macroeconomic backdrop, which are now discussed in
urn.
The first factor captures the idea of a threshold effect: as
ountries become more financially integrated, the risk-sharing
enefits increase nonlinearly. Many Context variables, like Con-
ag, are endogenous to the extent of financial integration. Closer
12 A number of studies have stressed the importance of context as an important
eterminant of the beneficial effects of financial integration. See Prasad et al.
2003) and Masten et al. (2008).
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ntegration fosters development of financial products to man-
ge and share new risks, for example there will be less need for
foreign exchange derivative market with little financial inte-
ration. Better private risk management is also encouraged by
reater integration, through better liquidity as well as learning-
y-doing. As a result, risk-sharing benefit may depend outright
n the degree of integration, and not just through Contag.
his linkage, if significant, lends support for further financial
ntegration as a means to break away from the ‘low integra-
ion equilibrium’ and unlock the benefits of international risk
haring.13
Countries whose financial markets are more developed,
hose access to advanced instruments such as derivatives is
eadily available, and whose market participants are better
nformed as well as more plentiful, are better equipped in deal-
ng with idiosyncratic risks and hence should be more likely to
enefit from risk sharing. But sharing risks requires a counter-
art, thus an uneven development in financial market is another
ossible explanation for limited risk sharing in some groups
f countries. To the extent that this is a binding constraint,
olicy efforts should focus on harmonizing market rules and
ractices, fostering financial market developments at a multilat-
ral platform and developing institutions more generally. Many
ecent policy recommendations by the IMF and others fall within
his category (see Cowen et al. (2006), FSAP reports for Asian
conomies, and more recently Gray et al. (2011) which discusses
he progress and future directions for bond market development
n ASEAN5).
As the total amount of risks depends on the volatility of
hocks, more volatility will lower BCS if the amount of risks
eing shared does not rise proportionately. Section 3 documents
nstances in which the estimated degree of risk sharing as mea-
ured by BCS indeed dropped in the period of extreme economic
urbulence. We consider a stronger hypothesis, however, that a
arger amount of total risks may reduce the absolute degree of
isk sharing (i.e. ‘Risks shared’ depends negatively on shock
olatility), particularly as shocks endogenously impair the abil-
ty of financial markets to allocate risks efficiently.14 In this case,
ountries should step up their efforts to cooperatively smooth out
hocks within the region, recognizing the limitations of financial
arkets in insuring against extremely large risks.
Macroeconomic environment in general may also help
xplain the differentiated degrees of risk sharing. Different
acroeconomic backdrops imply unbalanced dynamics and
ropagation of shocks, with in turn can affect the financial
arket’s ability to allocate risks across economies. Choices of
onetary policy frameworks, degrees of openness, and com-13 A related argument is that more open and integrated economies can better
ithstand economic volatility and may even be able to generate more produc-
ivity gains. See Kose et al. (2009) and references therein.
14 In models with strong financial accelerator or cascade mechanisms, this
egative dependence is not only theoretically possible but is likely. See Stiglitz
2010b).
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“Fig. 3. (a–f) Cost–benefit
ther hand, involves steps to harmonize the policy frameworks,
anging from a common recognition of broad policy priority to a
tronger form culminating in an adoption of a common currency
rea as suggested by Mundell (1973) for example.15
15 Mundell (1973) argued that one important benefit of a common currency
rea is better international risk sharing, since having a common price level will
. . .allow the country [hit by a negative income shock] to run down its currency
n
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fffs: EU, Japan and NIEs.
How quantitatively relevant are these four factors? In the
ext section, we propose a simple reduced-form empirical
trategy to address this question. Our approach is to exploit as
uch as possible the variation in the risk-sharing measures both
oldings and cushion the impact of the loss, drawing on the resources of the
ther country until the cost of adjustment has been efﬁciently spread over the
uture.”
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ross-sectionally and across time, and relate it to differences in
he determining factors.
. Making ﬁnancial integration works for AsiaOne salient feature of the BCS estimates obtained in Section
is the pattern of intra-regional risk sharing which varies across
ifferent groups and periods. We leverage on this variation to
dentify the relative importance of all the factors. For example,
r
r
r: ASEAN4, China and India.
f financial market development was an important determinant
f risk sharing, then those regions with more uneven financial
evelopment in certain period should have less intra-regional
isk sharing over that particular period. Similarly, more uneven
hocks or greater differences in macroeconomic environments in
he cross-section should help explain more limited intra-regional
isk sharing in any period. Meanwhile, a higher degree of intra-
egional integration should lead to more risk sharing within the
egion, other things being equal.
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Table 6
Determinants of intra-regional risk sharing.
OLS Fixed effects Random effects
intjt −0.023 −0.156 −0.041
(0.008)*** (0.052)*** (0.018)***
σjt(st gdp) 0.029 0.042 −0.062
(0.139) (0.101)
σjt(ip) 0.224 0.217 0.216
(0.066)*** (0.066)*** (0.066)***
σjt(π) 0.142 0.145 0.138
(0.074)** (0.073)*** (0.074)**
Constant −1.275 0.316 −1.114
(0.152)*** (0.286)***
R2 0.26 0.27 0.07
N 408 408 408
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** and ** indicate statistical significance
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To test these hypotheses, we consider three groups of
ountries: NIEs, ASEAN4 and US&EU. The dependent
ariable is the degree of intra-regional risk sharing within each
f these three regions. BCS is unfortunately a poor measure
or our purpose, as it must be defined over some time interval,
hich reduces the availability of time-series data. We therefore
ntroduce an alternative definition of intra-regional risk sharing.
or each group j∈ {NIEs, ASEAN4, US & EU}, we define σjt(m)
o be the log of cross-sectional standard deviation of log Mit
cross i∈ j for fixed t. σjt(m) is a measure of intra-regional risk
haring within region j, and is different from BCS since it is an
bsolute measure and a complete time series (hence more data
oints for estimation).
The measure of intra-regional financial integration is taken
rom the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)
ataset and defined to be the average proportion of portfolio
nvestment liabilities corresponding to creditors within the same
egion. A larger ratio therefore indicates closer intra-regional
nancial integration. The data are annual and available from
001 to 2009. For data congruency, we assume the ratios in
000 to be the same as 2001, and 2010 the same as 2009, respec-
ively. We then use quadratic interpolation to convert the data
nto monthly frequency. Denote these ratios by intjt.
The extent of unbalanced financial developments is cap-
ured by the log of cross-sectional standard deviations in the
atios of stock market capitalization to nominal GDP at each
ate t, denoted by σjt(st gdp). According to our hypothesis,
jt(st gdp) should have a positive impact on σjt(m), as more
neven development puts a drag on the ability of financial mar-
et to insure risks. There are admittedly many other measures of
nancial development, but their data availability is a limitation
nd interpretation is not necessarily less problematic.
As a proxy for size of shocks, we define σjt(ip) to be the log of
ross-sectional standard deviations at each date t of HP-filtered
ear-on-year growth in industrial production across each i in
. Larger σjt(ip) indicates a larger amount of real risks within
egion j that can potentially be shared.
The differences in general macroeconomic conditions is mea-
ured by the log of cross-sectional standard deviations in the
ear-on-year core inflation, denoted by σjt(π). This variable cap-
ures in a simple way the effects of monetary policy regimes,
ensitivity to commodity prices and imported inflation, as well
s relative position on the Phillips curve among others. The
pecification to be estimated is
jt(m) = α + β1intjt + β2σjt(st gdp) + β3σjt(ip)
+β4σjt(π) + ηj + εjt (5.1)
here ηj denotes unobserved region-specific time-invariant
ffect. Note that the specification does not explicitly condition
n contagion risks, because a time-series measure of contagion is
ot available. The implicit dependence on contagion risks will
nstead be picked up by intjt and ηj, which in turn will affect
he interpretation of β1. We estimate OLS (ignoring ηj), fixed
ffects and random effects, respectively. The results are reported
n Table 6.
t
h
it 1% and 5% respectively. Random effects estimation uses Wallace–Hussain
ethod to compute component variances.
Except for σjt(st gdp), the effects of all variables are statisti-
ally significant with signs that conform with the hypotheses for
ll three estimation methods. Risk sharing benefits are greater
n periods and regions with tighter financial integration, less
neven economic shocks and more similar inflation rates.
More financial integration raises the risk sharing benefit, but
his effect can arise both directly and indirectly through higher
ontagion risks. Differentiating the right hand side of equa-
ion (4.7), the total impact of integration on risk sharing can
e decomposed into two parts:
1
d Contag
d int
+ d F
d int
(5.2)
he first term is the ‘movement-along-the-curve’ effect of finan-
ial integration, where risk sharing is increased at the expense
f higher contagion risks. The second term is the ‘shift’ effect,
here integration improves the terms of tradeoff via the afore-
entioned threshold effect. The first term has a negative sign,
iven our assumption that contagion risks rise with financial
ntegration (d Contag/d int > 0) and that there exists an efficient
ost–benefit tradeoff (F1 < 0). Therefore our estimate of β1,
hich measures the net effect of integration on risk sharing,
ndicates that the second term dominates in size. Controlling for
xed effects, which pick up the exogenous parts of contagion
isks not explained by the degree of integration, the dominance
f the shift effect is even more evident (0.156 compared to 0.023
n the OLS case). The results therefore show that there are both
ovement and shift effects taking place as the degree of integra-
ion rises, but there are net increases in risk sharing. Despite this
izable net gain in risk sharing benefit associated with an outward
hift in the tradeoff line, the welfare implications remain unclear
owever, because contagion risks are forced to go up along with
isk sharing. It is still possible for welfare to decrease with the
egree of integration, if the welfare function is highly sensitive
o financial contagion.The importance of macroeconomic context is confirmed by
he estimates. Both cyclical shocks and inflation differentials
ave the potential to affect the degree of international risk shar-
ng, for any given level of contagion risks. It is worth noting that,
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ince the dependent variable is an absolute measure of risk shar-
ng, the dispersion in economic activity has an impact on risk
haring in absolute terms (i.e. it affects the amount of risks being
hared) and not just in relative terms (percentage of risks shared,
s inBCS). This result is consistent with the hypothesis that more
olatile economic shocks can impair the risk-sharing mecha-
ism. An implication is that risk sharing should not be thought
f as an insurance mechanism against catastrophic events. Its
enefit is reaped only slowly over time in an environment with
elatively moderate volatility.
Another policy implication is that the role of macroeconomic
olicy management should go beyond the traditional one of
nilateral discretion, since there is an element of externalities:
hen a country follows a certain path of stabilization policy
r adopts a certain level of inflation target, the decisions affect
he risk-sharing benefits enjoyed not only by itself but also by
ts neighbors. Continuing policy dialogue and coordination can
elp internalize these externalities and improve the sharing of
isks. For example, an acknowledgement of common shocks to
he region and a broad agreement of appropriate policy response
o address the shocks can have beneficial indirect effects on
nternational risk sharing.
The effect of σjt(st gdp) is found to be insignificant, which
ay owe in part to the sample size being to small to pin down the
ffect of a relatively stable structural variable. σjt(st gdp) varies
elatively little over time in the sample, making the identification
f its effect over business cycle frequency difficult. Meanwhile
he cross-sectional variation of σjt(st gdp) alone can only con-
ribute so much in a very small panel such as ours. There are
lso many dimensions to financial development than captured
y stock market capitalization to GDP. It may therefore be pre-
ature to reject the role of financial development in fostering
isk sharing, in light of both estimation and measurement issues.
stimates of other parameters are robust to dropping σjt(st gdp)
rom the specification, however.
Overall, the results show that there are indeed contextual fac-
ors capable of explaining the heterogeneous tradeoffs between
isk sharing and contagion risks. Policies aimed at influencing
hese factors can help to enhance the quality of regional finan-
ial integration and improve the terms of tradeoffs for Asia.
he fact that one significant factor, real shocks, fluctuates at
he business cycle frequency points towards the role of shorter-
erm policy in supporting risk sharing, in addition to structural
nfrastructure-based development policy that is often proposed.
he significance of inflation differentials suggests that more
niform policy framework can help improve risk sharing by
nducing more similar macroeconomic dynamics and condi-
ions. Meanwhile, the threshold effect of financial integration
s found to be important, hence more integration can lead to bet-
er quality of integration. The net effect on welfare is however
ade ambiguous by endogenous contagion, rendering the policy
mplications less clear-cut.. Conclusion
Using a novel measure based on an affine term structure
odel, risk sharing in Asia is found to be low intra-regionally.
e
t
t
wpment Finance 2 (2012) 101–117 115
he sharing of risks is far from perfect, and on a bilateral basis,
sian economies on average share more risk with the US and
U than among themselves. The degree of risk sharing gen-
rally fluctuates meaningfully over time unlike the downside
nancial contagion risks, which are more stable for any country
air according to our CoVaR-type estimates. There appears to be
n average a tradeoff between risk sharing and contagion risks,
uggesting that the degree of integration is a common driver of
he two. However, this average tradeoff is hardly a good rep-
esentative of individual Asian economies, and there is a large
ifference in the terms of tradeoffs across countries. The US
tands out as the one that reaps the most benefit from sharing
isks with Asia, for a given degree of contagion risk exposure.
he heterogeneity in these tradeoffs can partly be explained by
he degree of financial integration via threshold effects, as well as
ifferences in the size of economic shocks and macroeconomic
onditions.
The findings underline the need for Asian economies to
nhance the quality of financial integration within the region.
n other words, there is room for an appropriate policy to pro-
ote the degree of risk sharing without exposing countries to
reater contagion risks. Pursuing these regional policy avenues
hould receive a priority over a push for further overall financial
ntegration whose welfare effect may be ambiguous according
o our findings.
Our results lend support to policy measures that address
he qualitative aspect of financial integration. Development of
nstitutional investor base, through an expanded role of pen-
ion funds, insurance industry, and asset management funds can
elp strengthen the regional financial market and its risk-sharing
unction. An expansion of derivative markets and creation of
nancial products will provide additional risk management
apability that directly helps increase risk sharing, as well as
mprove market liquidity in traditional risky assets more gen-
rally. Harmonization of rules and practices, whether in terms
f regulations or tax treatments, can facilitate the creation of
sia-wide portfolio investments and strengthens risk sharing
echanism. Standardization of market infrastructure, for exam-
le through linkages of settlement systems, can similarly be
seful. For details of policy proposals along these lines, see IMF
2006) and Gray et al. (2011).
One possible issue for future research is an exploration of
ontagion and its determinants, on which this paper has little to
ay. Contagion risks in this paper are modeled as the extent of
pillover effect conditional on an exogenous event taking place
utside the domestic financial market. But a tail event such as a
nancial crisis is a dynamic phenomenon. Thus its unconditional
robability of occurrence is likely to vary over time, if only its
echanism can be better understood. Financial contagion can
lso be reinforced by feedback effects, as spillovers work both
ays. A better understanding of these mechanisms will enhance
ur understanding of the risk side of financial integration.
s far as policy is concerned, the findings in this paper arentirely consistent with prudential measures targeted at curbing
he degree of systemic risks. Indeed one way of improving
he terms of tradeoffs would be to reduce the spillover risks,
ithout sacrificing the risk-sharing gain. Policy efforts along
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oth lines will complement each other towards a common goal
n making financial integration work better for Asia.
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ppendix A. Data
ero-coupon yields
The data for zero-coupon yields are end-of-month series
aken from Bloomberg. The construction methodology is
ootstrapping. The following is the information provided by
loomberg.
The zero coupon yields are derived by stripping the par
coupon curve. Because zero coupon yields are derived from
underlying yield curves, any changes in the underlying
curve’s coverage can significantly change the zero coupon
values near the altered tenor. Using the set of coupon bonds,
bills, swaps or a combination of these instruments, the
discount factors for all tenors are derived using standard
bootstrapping. The zero-coupon yields are finally calculated
step-by-step using these discount factors. A minimum of four
instruments at different tenors are required for each yield
curve.
tock market indices
The data for stock market indices are end-of-week series
aken from Bloomberg. The following indices are used: Hang
eng (Hong Kong), KOSPI (Korea), FTSE Straits Times
Singapore), TWSE TAIEX (Taiwan), Jakarta Composite Index
JSX (Indonesia), FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI (Malaysia),
hilippines Stock Exchange PSEi (the Philippines), SET
Thailand), Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite (China), BSE
ensex 30 (India), Dow Jones Industrial Average (US), and DAX
EU).
thers
exretn−1t+1 ≡ pn−1t+1 − pnt + p1t
= An−1 + B′n−1Xt+1
= An−1 + B′n−1(μ +
= (−An + An−1 + BThe Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)
ataset is provided by the IMF at http://www.imf.org/
xternal/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm. Stock market capitalization,
A
Apment Finance 2 (2012) 101–117
ominal GDP, year-on-year changes in industrial production,
nd year-on-year changes in core inflation are taken from CEIC.
ppendix B. Adrian–Moench procedure
This appendix provides a brief overview of Adrian and
oench (2010) to motivate the implementation of their 3-step
egression procedure. Note that the log excess return of holding
n n-period bond for one period accrued at time t + 1 can be
xpanded as
n − B′nXt + A1 + B′1Xt
+ Σεt+1) − An − B′nXt + A1 + B′1Xt
+ A1) + (B′n−1K − B′n + B′1)Xt + B′n−1Σεt+1
(B.1)
here we assume thatpnt is affine inXt as in Eq. (3.6). Conjecture
he solution for exretn−1t+1 of the form
xretn−1t+1 = B′n−1Σ[Λ0 + Λ1Xt + εt+1] (B.2)
quating the right hand side of Eq. (B.2) to that of Eq. (B.1) and
atching terms, it can easily be verified that the set of implied
olutions for An and B′n is identical to that of Eq. (3.7) up to the
onvexity terms.
This equivalence implies that the prices of risk parameters,
0 and Λ1, can be estimated by performing a 3-step regression
n Eq. (B.2). First, the state equation (3.1) is estimated using
LS to get estimates for μ, K, Σ as well as the residual εˆt+1.
he second step involves performing a series of cross-sectional
LS on
xretn−1t+1 = an−1 + b′n−1Xt + c′n−1εˆt+1 + error (B.3)
or all n and stacking the estimated coefficients to get aˆ =
aˆ1, . . . , aˆN ], ˆb = [ˆb′1, . . . , ˆb′N ]′, and cˆ = [cˆ′1, . . . , cˆ′N ]′. Finally,
n view of Eqs. (B.2) and (B.3), estimates for Λ0 and Λ1 can be
btained by regressing aˆ on cˆ and ˆb on cˆ, respectively
ˆΛ0 = (cˆ′cˆ)−1cˆ′aˆ
ˆΛ1 = (cˆ′cˆ)−1cˆ′ ˆb
(B.4)
In actual implementation, the last step is modified slightly to
orrect for the convexity term:
ˆ 0 = (cˆ′cˆ)−1cˆ′
(
aˆ + 1
2
b∗vec(Σ)
)
(B.5)
here b* is an N×K matrix with n-th row filled by ˆb′n ⊗ ˆb′n, and
ec(Σ) is the vectorized Σ.
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